This paper will argue that counterinsurgency doctrine is relevant as it relates to the current context of the ‘War on Terror’. It will do this by using examples of its effectiveness when used appropriately, or lack thereof when not applied adequately, as a means to support the papers conclusions, including excerpts from recognised experts in the field of strategy as it relates to counterterrorism. Furthermore, for clarification of terms in this essay, it is noted that the phrase, ‘War on Terror’ will be recognised more as a political statement rather than a tactic as it has been traditionally known.
In order to be able to answer the above question and analyse the relevant relationship between the two, namely counterinsurgency and the war on terror, in an efficient manner, this paper will consider the tactics of terrorism and insurgency, for the most part, as very similar. In the words of Colin S. Gray, these are, ”by definition, conflicts other than regular to regular war“. Furthermore, he goes on to explain that, “terrorists are people who seek political ends through behaviour that deliberately induce fear…“ and use tactics that, “are the tactics of the belligerent unable in mass and firepower to stand and fight a regular battle or campaign with a reasonable prospect of success; they are the tactics of the weak.” And lastly, “Counterinsurgency are those political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.”
As a ‘counter’ to insurgency, or ‘counterinsurgency’ strategy, this paper will provide the said evidence that it is relevant as a proper response to the ‘War on Terror’. It needs to be noted that the above statement is predicated on the assumption that counterinsurgency doctrine is applied in full and is implemented will full vigour, support and scope, and under this assumption, then it can be considered as an effective method in advancing the goals and aims of the ‘War on Terror’.
Firstly, using the three principled approach suggested by the French counterinsurgency expert Trinquier as a classical model, he lays out his strategy in three concise steps:
- Separate the guerrilla from the population that supports him;
- Occupy the zones that the guerrillas previously operated from, making them dangerous for him and turning the people against the guerrilla movement; and
- Coordinate actions over a wide area and for a long enough time that the guerrilla is denied access to the population centres that could support him.
Moreover, as further evidence to support his strategy from yet another counterinsurgent specialist and to corroborate it in relation to the steps above, by reaffirming this initial step and by showing that maximising the effect of a counter-insurgent doctrine includes distinguishing between enemy combatants and the civilian population, William B. Caldwell states,
The law of armed conflict requires that, to use force, “combatants” must distinguish individuals presenting a threat from innocent civilians. This basic principle is accepted by all disciplined militaries. In the counterinsurgency, disciplined application of force is even more critical because our enemies camouflage themselves in the civilian population. Our success in Iraq depends upon our ability to treat the civilian population with humanity and dignity, even as we remain ready to immediately defend ourselves, or Iraqi civilians, when a threat is detected.
A successful example of separating the enemy from the civilian population and thereby creating a situation that allowed a great increase of intelligence gathering occurred with the implementation of the Combined Action Program (CAP) by US Marines in Vietnam. The aim was to ‘separate’ them by several methods centred on pacification of the local indigenous peoples. CAP consisted of the combination of US Marine rifle squads with local platoon forces in villages where the local forces lived. Robert Cassidy, in speaking of its effectiveness stated,
The combined Marine/Indigenous platoon trained, patrolled, defended, and lived in the village together. The mission of the CAP was to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure within the village or hamlet area of responsibility; protect bases and communications within the villages and hamlets; organise indigenous intelligence nets; participate in civic action; and conduct propaganda against the Viet Cong…because it protected the people from reprisals (italics added), it was ideal for gaining intelligence from the locals.
The efficiency of CAP can be illustrated by the fact that, “CAP units accounted for 7.6 percent of the enemy killed while representing only 1.5 percent of the Marines in Vietnam.” It should be noted that if the United States of America would have multiplied the successes of programs like CAP more generally, thereby duplicating their success throughout the Vietnam Conflict, the outcome may have generated enough support from the indigenous population throughout all areas of operation and would have been able to contribute to the conflict on a much more macro level, thereby potentially changing the outcome in Vietnam over time.
Although the current ‘War on Terror’ consists much less of an actual guerrilla war, with the enemy comprised of large forces as in Vietnam, the mindset of the enemy is very similar, although as mentioned above, less concentrated. To illustrate this point, using the analogy of the plight of a flea, Robert Taber states,
Analogically, the guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog’s disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough – this is the theory – the dog succumbs to the exhaustion and anaemia without ever having found anything on which to close its jaws or to rake with its claws.
Although this type of war, the War of the Flea, is much more difficult for western powers, who are accustomed to fighting more conventional types of conflict; as they train, re-allocate resources and increase and employ historically effective counterterrorism methods, coupled with modern technologies, the tide will begin to turn in their favour as seen in the above example and the ‘war of the flea’ will actually be winnable. Furthermore, quoting from Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century--Creating a National Framework,
"Our national security system is principally designed to deter and defeat state-based threats, which it does with great success. But it is precisely because of our overwhelming capability to overcome conventional threats that our enemies will attempt to defeat us through other means. That fact, along with the increasing danger of transnational, regional, and sub-state threats has made it clear that the most dangerous threats the United States will face in the 21st century are as likely to come not from other states but from within states, and principally from within weak or poorly-governed states."
Professor Hugh Strachan, speaking on the subject of British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq, used the example of the conflict in Malaya as yet another time tested and legitimate classical model as a basis to be incorporated in the current ‘War on Terror’. Some of the principles that were present and incorporated in this conflict, were, first-of-all, legitimacy. Since the British government were considered the recognised government of the day as an imperial power in Malaya, the ‘hearts and minds’ of the citizenry were accustomed to their rule, and with this historical British authority came the power to lead without the necessity to appease. Secondly, the British army had historically practiced colonial warfare extensively and because of this legacy was able to adapt their experiences and knowledge in Malaya. Thirdly, knowledge gained from the failures experienced in Palestine in the late nineteen forties, and by learning from these mistakes, allowed the British to learn from history and this helped maximise their success in Malaya. Fourthly, because of an historical governmental structure that was in place, the apparatus of British bureaucracy in Malaya was present and therefore provided a very good framework for a focused and accurate intelligence gathering process. Finally, popular consent was not necessarily achieved because the Malayan people loved the government; it was present because the people recognized it as the proper authority. John A. Lynn summarises,
"Without undermining their legitimacy, the British effectively weakened the insurgents in Malaya by isolating them from their supporters…by relocating this population into fortified settlements, the British locked the pro-insurgent population in and the insurgents out…counterinsurgents must be able to isolate insurgents from their support base to achieve victory…the majority of the population must eventually come to see insurgents as outsiders, as outlaws."
However, although the above examples are models from the past that can give strategic counterterrorist strategists a foundation to work from, it must be noted that the current situation in the world and the tactics and strategies used by modern day insurgents/terrorists, necessitate the need to adapt and update current counterinsurgent models to accommodate new technologies, including ideologies, and must consider the global nature of the current threat faced. In other words, the examples given above may remain and be used in a tactical or strategic sense, but will need to be updated and multiplied extensively to be effective in the current global climate. As stated by, David Kilcullen, in Counterinsurgency Redux,
"An enormous amount of classical counterinsurgency remains relevant. Indeed, counterinsurgency provides the ‘best fit’ framework for strategic problems in the War on Terrorism. But much is new in counterinsurgency…possibly requiring fundamental re-appraisals of conventional wisdom."
The remainder of this paper will look at the methods necessary to combat terrorism in the modern day.
First-of-all, understanding the true nature of the current war on terror is of utmost importance. If any counterinsurgency is to be successful it is necessary to understand who the enemy is and what their goals and desires are. Carl von Clausewitz, in his classic, On War elaborates,
"The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, not trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive."
Furthermore, David Kilcullen explains that the current, “ ‘War on Terrorism’, is a defensive war against a worldwide Islamist jihad.” In this context, it is noted, that the era of fighting sovereign nation states, in traditional state on state battle, in modern times, may well be a thing of the past. Moreover, in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, it notes,
"Political power is the central issue in an insurgency, and each side has this as its aim. The insurgent attempts to overthrow or subvert an established government or authority; the counterinsurgent, uses all of the instruments of national power to support the government in restoring and enforcing the rule of law…indeed, this possible scale and complexity must be understood before the beginning of any such operation."
This paper will now consider that the ‘Winning Hearts and Minds’ approach in counterterrorism strategy is the correct and most successful method. It is necessary to define the above terms so that their relevance will be understood in the context of this paper. Firstly, ‘Winning Hearts’, as stated by Kilcullen, is, “Convincing the population that its interests are best served by cooperating with the occupation”, and ‘Minds’, “Convincing people that the coalition forces will win the conflict.”
Setting the above as a basis to work from, and assuming counterterrorist methods are the best means in combating the “War on Terror’, several suggested recommendations follow, not to be considered as an exhaustive list, but to be seen as examples of how the implementation of counterterrorism doctrine is relevant to the ‘War on Terror’.
Firstly, one of the main problems in many conflicts throughout history, including Vietnam, for example, and present day Iraq, is the fact that the borders of each are surrounded by other sovereign states. John A. Lynn, elaborates, “An insurgency today is more likely to cross borders, particularly those drawn without respect to ethnic, cultural or religious realities.” Depending on the political philosophy of a particular neighbour, it may be necessary to spend a tremendous amount of effort, either physically securing the border, or providing monetary incentives to the population, to aid in disallowing resources from reaching the insurgents, thereby empowering them with the necessary will and means to continue their struggle. Also, providing and sustaining a financial aid program for the local population will go along way in countering any like aid provided by the insurgents.
Secondly, a vital and key ingredient necessary in the ‘Hearts and Minds’ approach is, training, for the local population. By providing locals with the necessary training, including working physically together with them in communities, will not only allow them to take more responsibility, therefore adding legitimacy to the overall counterinsurgency, but will show the local general population that they are real partners in the struggle and that the ‘foreigners’ are willing to get their hands dirty, so to speak. As noted by John A. Lynn,
"To succeed, the United States must gain the support, or at least the compliance, of the majority of Iraq’s population, but this will mean U.S. troops have to accept risks. Sending patrols out into the streets is a great deal more dangerous than from bombing from 10,000 feet up."
There are many other advantages to training local populations, who can then over time, take more and more responsibility for their own security, thereby gaining confidence and pride in their own ability to provide this security. The knock on affect of the training will also lead to the logical reduction of foreign forces necessary to maintain the gained progress.
Thirdly, in a world where access to media information is available from a wide variety of sources, twenty-four hours a day, it is vitally important to reduce popular support for insurgents. To do this, a concentrated anti-insurgent propaganda campaign will need to be instituted to continue to persuade the local population to the cause, thereby moving a step closer in the battle for their ‘Hearts and Minds’ and ultimately provide them with a chance of long term security.
In conclusion, this paper has looked at classical examples of how counterinsurgency tactics have been successful in the past as it relates to the current ‘War on Terror’ and has provided examples from modern strategic doctrine to supply evidence to support the conclusion that counterinsurgency doctrine is relevant today in the war on terror. This paper also concludes that counterinsurgency doctrine as it relates to the modern day ‘War on Terror’, will continue to be relevant for decades to come. However, if the West (USA in particular) continues to resist adapting itself to this future, the result may be the loss of the fight in the long term because of the inability of its populace to sustain the will to fight long conflicts.
And finally, in the words of David Kilcullen, “Indeed, counter-insurgency provides the ‘best fit’ framework for strategic problems in the ‘War on Terror.
Anson Bentley
